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Little is known about ordinary people’s understandings of conspiracy beliefs and how 
these understandings relate to the perspectives of researchers and scholars.  Working within 
a social constructionist epistemological framework, we conducted a Q-methodology study 
aiming to identify a range of lay perspectives on two key topics: the defining features of 
conspiracy beliefs; and aspects considered important in judging their plausibility.  Fifty-six 
people (32 men and 24 women), recruited via regional UK Facebook groups, sorted their 
agreement with a set of statements on each of the two topics.  A principal component 
analysis, followed by varimax rotation, was performed on each data set.  Five accounts 
about the defining features of conspiracy beliefs were identified:  that they are false, illogical 
and harmful; that they are forms of political critique; that there are varied types; that they are 
entertaining but ineffectual; and that they are held by a self-reinforcing minority.  Four 
accounts about their evaluation were identified:  conventional realist criteria; the importance 
of personal judgement; skeptical realism; and the assessment of critical thinking.  The 
findings are discussed in the context of the literature and limitations of the study are 
considered.  Implications for research and educational and policy interventions are outlined. 
 
 
Keywords:  Conspiracy belief; Conspiracy theories; Q-methodology; plausibility 
judgements; heuristics; social construction 
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The social construction of conspiracy beliefs: 






It is hard to think of any contemporary area of politics or public policy, internationally, 
where conspiracy beliefs are not currently a matter of debate in public discourse.  But how 
we conceive of them shapes both our research strategy and policy interventions.  For 
example, are we living in a “golden age of conspiracy theories” (Guilhot & Moyn, 2020) or 
have they been even more prevalent historically (Uscinski & Parent, 2014)?  Are they 
inherently harmful or are some harmless and even entertaining?   
 
Conspiratorial beliefs have received increased attention from both journalists and 
researchers in recent years (Butter & Knight, 2019) but they are often discussed as if they 
were understood to have a stable and universal definition and to be self-evidently 
implausible.  Yet, surprisingly, there has been little investigation of whether lay people share 
these assumptions.  Without such an understanding, there is a risk that public discussion 
about conspiracy beliefs and interventions to counter those with harmful consequences are 
misdirected and, potentially, counterproductive.  Since the general population is comprised 
of different groups and sub-cultures, the extent to which researcher definitions of 
conspiratorial belief are shared by ordinary people might vary. 
 
The conceptual and methodological assumptions of researchers can have a 
significant influence on how conspiracy beliefs are understood.  For example, a recent 
survey of Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs amongst 2,501 UK adults reported that “25% 
showed a degree of endorsement, 15% showed a consistent pattern of endorsement, and 
10% had very high levels of endorsement” (Freeman et al., 2020, p.1) but a study using the 
same questions with a different sample and response format reported much lower levels of 
endorsement (Sutton & Douglas, 2020). 
 
The lack of knowledge about lay understandings is of particular concern since a 
somewhat uncritical realist perspective is currently dominant in public discourse about -- and 
research into -- conspiracy theories.  This assumes that conspiracy beliefs are false and 
harmful, held only by a minority with their plausibility best judged according to the 
conventional criteria for evaluating scientific theories.  They are also assumed to be 
homogenous and a priori assumptions are made about their plausibility, reflected in the 
kinds of beliefs selected as conspiracy theories.  Yet, as we will discuss further below, there 
are competing scholarly perspectives on the nature of conspiracy beliefs (i.e. their definition 
and meaning) and on how their plausibility might be judged and it is unclear whether lay 
people utilize the kinds of criteria assumed by researchers in judging their plausibility.   
 
Since it is important to make as few a priori assumptions as possible we adopt the 
theoretical framework of social constructionism and Q-methodology.  Although Q-
methodology can be used from different epistemological standpoints, Stainton Rogers and 
Dyson (2012) argue that, utilized from a social constructionist perspective, it can “be used to 
map out the terrain of possible/culturally available viewpoints on a topic” (2012, p.199) and 
can explore “the complex interplays among and between the discourses occupying the 
various niches within a discursive eco-system” (2012, p.200).  Rather than take a “top-down” 
expert-driven approach to the definition of conspiratorial belief, we adopt a more “bottom-up” 
perspective, by examining lay perspectives.  We report the results of two Q-methodology 
studies of ordinary people in the UK aiming to elucidate: what they identify as the defining 
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features of conspiracy beliefs; and what aspects they consider important in judging their 
plausibility.   
 
In order to locate our study in the context of the literature, we will briefly review a 
range of research perspectives.  Firstly, we will discuss how conspiracy beliefs have been 
defined.  Secondly, we will discuss views of how their plausibility might be judged. 
 
Competing Scholarly Perspectives on the Defining Features of Conspiratorial Belief  
 
Three broad, though overlapping, perspectives on the defining features of conspiracy 
beliefs can be delineated.  As we have already noted, the most dominant in psychological 
and political science research is a conventional realist perspective which dates back to 
Hofstadter’s (1964) description of conspiracy thinking as reflecting a “paranoid style”.  
Lewandowsky and colleagues (Lewandowsky et al., 2015; Lewandowsky & Cook, 2020) 
identify seven traits of such thinking:  a tolerance for contradictory beliefs; a nihilistic degree 
of skepticism about official accounts; an assumption of nefarious intent; continually 
questioning that “something must be wrong” with official accounts; viewing oneself as a 
persecuted victim; engaging in “self-sealing” thinking that renders beliefs immune to 
evidence; and interpreting random events as part of a conspiracy. Hofstadter (1964) saw 
conspiracy theories as primarily propounded by political minorities on the right of American 
politics and, more recently, Uscinski and Parent (2014) have suggested that conspiracy 
beliefs are endorsed by political “losers” seeking to generate collective political action 
against a perceived threat.  Within this perspective, conspiracy beliefs are often seen as 
harmful because they can reduce institutional trust and increase prejudice (Douglas et al., 
2019) and may also lead to “vaccine hesitancy” – of particular concern in the midst of the 
Coronavirus pandemic (Freeman et al., 2020; Hornsey et al., 2018). 
 
A second perspective is that conspiracy beliefs can be identified by particular 
narrative features or tropes and this is a more common approach in cultural and literary 
studies (Butter & Knight, 2019), some psychological work (Byford, 2011) and information 
science (Samory & Mitra, 2018).  The focus in this perspective is less on doxastic aspects of 
conspiracy beliefs but, rather, their narrative form (e.g. the presence of identified 
conspirators and secret plots) and they may be viewed as more widespread in society, 
endorsed by more people and with a range of functions, including entertainment (e.g. TV 
series like The X-Files).  However, some have argued that many conspiracy beliefs do not 
involve identifiable plots and conspirators but rather “counter conventional narratives with 
suspicions and allegations” (Dean, 2000).  A recent variant of this broader skeptical narrative 
has been the “new conspiracism” (Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2019) characterized by 
insinuation, assertion, delegitimation and destabilization.   
 
A third perspective, found within the sociological and cultural studies literature, 
adopts a similar definition to that of the second perspective.  However, within this tradition 
there is much more of a thoroughgoing attempt to understand their meaning in a non-
pathologizing manner (Butter & Knight, 2019).  Conspiracy beliefs may be seen as 
meaningful attempts to understand opaque and abstract historical forces (Grewal, 2016), 
reflecting broader cultural anxieties and institutional distrust (Dean, 2000).  They may be 
viewed as a popular form of knowledge, circulating outside of official channels (Birchall, 
2006), moving from the fringes of culture to the mainstream (Barkun, 2003).  Indeed, those 
endorsing such beliefs may view themselves as “critical free thinkers”, engaging in social 
and political critique (Harambam, 2020).  Within this perspective, theories are seen as forms 
of “stigmatized knowledge” (Barkun, 2003), unwanted by experts and elites (Bratich, 2008).  
These scholars emphasize that definitions of “conspiracy theories” are often ideological in 
nature with reference, for example, to Hofstadter’s political centrism (Butter & Knight, 2019).  
They often argue that the terms “conspiracy theory” and “conspiracy theorist” may serve to 
delegitimize accounts (e.g. Harambam, 2020). 
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Competing Scholarly Perspectives on Evaluating the Plausibility of Beliefs 
 
There are a range of different criteria by which the plausibility of conspiracy beliefs 
might be evaluated (Pauly, 2020) but, here, we will focus on two broad but again, 
overlapping, perspectives:  conventional realist criteria for evaluating theories and their 
evidence; and heuristics concerning the motives and credibility of those making claims. 
 
The first perspective treats conspiratorial belief claims like scientific theories, using 
conventional realist criteria from the philosophy of science (Pauly, 2020).  Thus, a warranted 
conspiracy belief would be the best and most parsimonious explanation of the observed 
evidence, without strong contradicting evidence (Pauly, 2020).  However, it has proven 
difficult to formulate criteria which would differentiate between warranted and unwarranted 
conspiracy theories (Keeley, 1999; Pauly, 2020).  There have been two groupings which 
have developed in response:  the “generalists” and the “particularists” (Pauly, 2020). 
 
Generalists are those who presume that conspiracy beliefs are implausible in 
general.  They argue that, although conspiracies do occur, they are rare and likely to be 
exposed or to fail given the difficulties in organizing them and keeping people quiet 
especially if they involve large numbers of people over long periods of time (Douglas et al., 
2019).  Thus, Levy (2007, p.181) suggests that “it is almost never rational to accept such a 
conspiracy theory”.  The generalist viewpoint is dominant in psychological and political 
science research (e.g. Douglas et al., 2019).  Proponents suggest that, since the reasoning 
process underlying conspiracy beliefs is flawed, skepticism is warranted where belief claims 
exhibit characteristic features of conspiracy thinking (e.g. Lewandosky et al., 2015; 
Lewandowsy & Cook, 2020).   
 
Particularists take issue with this argument.  Pigden (1993), for example, has argued 
that a conspiratorial explanation for historical events is sometimes appropriate.  Instead, 
though still advocating the importance of realist criteria, scholars within this tradition (e.g. 
Coady, 2012; Dentith, 2018) argue that conspiratorial explanations need to be evaluated on 
a case-by-case basis, since conspiracies are not quite as rare as might be presumed and, 
indeed, may be more likely in particular contexts (e.g. crime, espionage, totalitarian societies 
etc.). 
 
Although it has yet to be applied to conspiracy beliefs, research on public 
understandings of science, health and risk is very relevant to public perceptions of 
conspiracy beliefs and, we will argue, could be said to constitute a second broad 
perspective.  These researchers posit that, since lay people lack the technical knowledge to 
evaluate scientific knowledge claims, they rely, instead, on a range of heuristics.  Common 
heuristics include making assessments of a purported authority’s expertise (Cummings, 
2014) and their competence, care, fairness, and openness (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003).  
However, public skepticism can be affected by perceptions of credibility, reliability, and 
integrity (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003), perceptions that information is biased or distorted 
(Frewer et al., 1996) and concerns about the motives both of experts and informal sources 
of knowledge (Larson et al., 2018).  Although higher levels of scientific consensus may lead 
to increased public perceptions of certainty about scientific knowledge this may be 
moderated if a person’s overall trust in science is low (Chinn et al., 2018).  Moreover, people 
may attend more to information about a source’s perceived expertise and benevolence when 
evaluating conflicting scientific claims (Thomm & Bromme, 2016).  Concerns about bias and 
the influence of vested interests in science are key concerns of conspiracy beliefs and 
believers (Harambam, 2020) and may, therefore, resonate with broader public skepticism.   
 
A range of research perspectives are thus available both about how we might define 
conspiratorial beliefs and how we might judge their plausibility.  Our aim in this study is to 
elucidate lay perspectives on these two topics since we do not know how research 
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perspectives relate to public perceptions.  Indeed, there may be lay perspectives not 
currently addressed by researchers.  As this is the first study of conspiracy belief using Q-
methodology, a subsidiary aim was to test the feasibility of the design so that, in the future, it 






Although Q-methodology can be used with individuals in a similar manner to 
repertory grids it is generally used with multiple participants when conducted from a social 
constructionist viewpoint (Stainton Rogers & Dyson, 2012; Watts & Stenner, 2012).  In a Q-
methodology study each participant takes individual statements from the Q-Set (the overall 
list of statements) and places them in a pattern (the Q-Sort).   Factor analytic statistical 
techniques are then used but, whereas, in traditional factor analysis where the factors 
represent clusters of correlated statements, in Q-factor analysis, the factors are clusters of 
participants who have rated and sorted statements about the topic in similar ways.  From a 
Foucauldian point of view each participant’s Q-Sort represents their subject position whilst 
the factors can be seen as representing discourses (Watts & Stenner, 2012).  However, it is 
not assumed that each participant would always sort in the same way nor that participants 
only draw on one discourse -- a person might draw on different discursive resources 
depending on the interactional context. The factors indicate what discursive resources are 
available to participants (i.e. the range of perspectives available about a topic) and might be 
hypothesized to have more stability over time whereas individuals could potentially sort in 
different ways over time (with some people’s sorts being more consistent over time than 
others).  We return to the relationship between individuals and the factors in the discussion. 
 
The study utilized two Q-Sets:  Q-Set 1 focused on defining features of conspiracy 
beliefs whilst Q-Set 2 focused on what aspects of conspiracy beliefs might make them seem 
more, or less, plausible. The study received ethical approval from the university’s 




Developing the Q-Sets 
 
Watts and Stenner (2005, p.75) argue that Q-sets “can be elicited from any number 
of sources,” with the goal of being “‘broadly representative’ of the relevant opinion domain, 
and this aim might clearly be satisfied in a number of different ways.”  They state that the 
key criteria for Q-Sets are coverage and balance.  As recommended by Watts and Stenner 
(2005), we elicited statements from publications from a range of research perspectives (i.e. 
those reviewed in the introduction) identified in a narrative review process using broad 
search terms like “conspiracy theory” and ‘conspiracy belief”.  Items were also derived from 
scales measuring conspiracy beliefs and Samory and Mitra’s (2018) comprehensive textual 
analysis of discussions in reddit conspiracy forums.  Popular and social media were also 
sampled by using terms like “conspiracies” and “conspiracy theory” to search for relevant 
discussions in blogs, internet forums, websites and youtube videos.   
 
We sought informal feedback from 14 lay people (eight women and six men with an 
average age of 48.3 from a range of occupations and ethnic backgrounds) who were 
acquaintances of the first author.  Feedback was sought in three waves:  four people (first 
wave); five people (second wave); and another five people (third wave). In the first wave of 
feedback, four lay people were informally interviewed about how they would define and 
judge the plausibility of conspiracy beliefs.  Watts and Stenner (2005, p.75) suggest that 
statement lists can be drawn from, or supplemented by, “formal interviews” and “informal 
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discussions”.  Interviewees are not required to be subject matter experts and can include, as 
we did here, potential participants.  We sought to identify if there were any major gaps in our 
coverage of the concourse.   
 
Watts and Stenner (2012) suggest the use of pragmatic categories to check 
coverage.  The initial version of Q-Set 1 had 73 statements organised under the following 
categories of defining descriptive features of conspiracy beliefs and believers: thematic 
content; narrative form; identified conspirators; aspects of reasoning; the credibility of 
information sources; features of believers; and the consequences of beliefs.  Q-Set 2 had 63 
statements and the categories related to how the plausibility of conspiracy theories might be 
judged:  aspects of the belief; aspects of reasoning; evidential basis; the extent of social 
support for beliefs; and aspects of conspiracy believers.  A list with too many statements 
from one category can render a Q-Set unbalanced, whilst an overly inclusive list can make 
the sorting task long and demanding and so item lists need to be refined.  For example, 
instead of an exhaustive list of all the potential harms of conspiracy beliefs we sought to 
ensure representation of higher order categories (e.g. “negative consequences” and 
“mistrust in society”).  So that the Q-sets were not perceived to be biased we used 
descriptive terminology and sought to avoid implicit value judgements.  Thus, we referred to 
“conspiracy beliefs” and “conspiracy believers” rather than more pejorative terms like 
“conspiracy theory” or “conspiracy theorist”.   
 
Stainton-Rogers and Dyson (2012, p.202) suggest that informal feedback should be 
sought “on whether there is a numerical balance between statements likely to be agreed or 
disagreed with, whether they are easy to understand and whether any items are duplicated 
or omitted”.  Thus, our second wave of feedback involved asking a further five lay people to 
apply these criteria to the 73 statements in Q-Set 1 and the 63 statements in Q-Set 2.  In 
addition, the authors also used the criteria to refine the lists and rephrase statements (e.g. 
for clarity and balance) resulting in a final list of 34 statements for Q-Set 1 and 37 
statements for Q-Set 2.   
 
In our third wave of feedback, a further five lay people were asked to complete the 
online Q-Sort procedure with the final Q-Sets.  They reported no problems and so no 
changes were made to the procedure. 
 
 
Gathering Q-Sort data 
 
The study was conducted online in 2019 using Q-sortware 
(http://www.qsortware.net/).  In Q-methodology statements are sorted into a forced-choice 
quasi-normal frequency distribution.  For each Q-Set, participants sorted each statement into 
one of nine columns expressing their level of agreement with it ranging from “strongly 
disagree” (-4) to neutral (0) to “strongly agree” (+4).  Figure 1 shows the distribution of the 34 
cells for Q-Sort 1.  As Q-Set 2 included three more statements than Q-Set 1, each of the -1, 
0 and +1 columns had an extra cell 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
For Q-Set 1, participants were asked to sort according to whether the feature 
referred to in the statement was important in defining a conspiracy theory.  Thus, if they 
strongly agreed with a statement it would be placed in the furthest right-hand column (+4) 
whilst, if they strongly disagreed with the statement, it would be placed in the furthest left-
hand column.  For Q-Set 2, statements about aspects which participants thought made a 
conspiracy belief less plausible were placed in the left-hand columns with -4 indicating the 
least plausibility whilst those making a belief seem more plausible were sorted into columns 
on the right-hand side.  For both Q-Sets the column in the middle was labelled “neutral”.  At 
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the end of the sorting procedure the program requested that participants provide 
demographic data and answer open-ended questions about how they had sorted the 
statements 
 
Participants and Recruitment   
 
In Q-methodology, the sampling strategy is aimed at ensuring the recruitment of 
participants with different perspectives on a topic.  Since correlates of conspiracy belief 
endorsement include a number of demographic variables, like education and age (Douglas 
et al., 2019), it seemed reasonable to recruit a general population sample varying across a 
number of demographic variables.   
 
The study was advertised via regional UK Facebook groups which resulted in the 
successful recruitment of 56 participants from varied geographical regions – this sample size 
is within the 40-60 range recommended by Watts and Stenner (2012).  There were 32 men 
and 24 women, and their ages ranged from 18-69 (M = 38.87, SD = 14.13).  Using UK 
Census categories, participants identified as white British (42), “any other white background” 
(5), black African (3), Indian (2), Bangladeshi (2), “white and black Caribbean” (1) and “white 
and black African” (1).  Twenty-eight participants reported having no religious affiliation and 
the remaining participants identified as Christian (20), Muslim (4), “other” (2), Hindu (1) and 
Jewish (1).  Political affiliations were reported as:  Conservative (17); Labor (14); Liberal 
Democrat (10); Green Party (2); Independent Group (2); Plaid Cymru (2); Scottish National 
Party (1); and “other” (8).  Forty-two participants reported they were in full or part-time work, 
seven were students, four were retired and two were unemployed.  Seventeen participants 
were classified as professionals (e.g. doctor), 18 in a job that held responsibility (e.g. 
lecturer, local government), nine were in non-manual jobs (e.g. nurse), three were skilled 
manual workers and eight were in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs.  Fifteen participants 
reported their highest qualification as a postgraduate degree, 17 an undergraduate degree, 
seven a diploma/vocational qualification, 11 a College or sixth form qualification, three a 
secondary school qualification, two left school before the age of sixteen and one reported 
having an “other” qualification.  Although Q-methodology studies do not aim to have 
demographically representative samples (Watts and Stenner, 2012) it is worth noting that, 
whereas 42% of the UK population aged between 21-64 are graduates (Office for National 




Each Q-Sort was analyzed independently using PQMethod version 2.35 (Schmolck, 
2014). For each Q-Sort, a principal component analysis was conducted, followed by a 
varimax rotation.  Whilst some authorities advise that the number of factors to be extracted 
should be guided by whether eigenvalues are over 1.0 this can result in the extraction of 
“spurious factors” (Brown, 1980).  Noting this debate, Watts and Stenner (2012) argue that, 
in addition to considering eigenvalues and total variance, decisions about the number of 
factors should also be guided by the meaning and significance of the factors in relation to 
the research questions.  To guide the choice in the current study, the authors decided to 
choose to extract, for each Q-Sort, the number of factors which provided the best balance of 
the following criteria:   
 
• The largest number of coherent factors (to represent the widest range of 
perspectives) 
• Where the factors accounted for a large percentage of the variance 
• Where the factors had loadings from larger numbers of participants with no factor 
having only one participant loading on it 
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For Q-Sort 1, Brown’s (1980) equation provided the best balance of the criteria resulting 
in a five-factor solution.  For Q-Sort 2, applying Humphrey’s rule less stringently provided the 
best balance.  Humphrey’s rule posits that “a factor is significant if the cross-product of its 
two highest loadings (ignoring the sign) exceeds twice the standard error” (Watts & Stenner, 
2012, p.107).  However, Watts and Stenner (2012) argue that this rule can be applied less 
stringently so that the cross-products simply need to exceed the standard error. Adapting 
Humphrey’s rule in this way resulted in a four-factor solution for Q-Sort 2.  Deploying the 
same criteria for both Q-Sorts would have seen lower variance in a factor solution, factors 





We report the full factor arrays for each Q-Sort (i.e. ratings of +4, +3, +2, +1, 0, -1, -2, 
-3, and -4).  However, as is common practice in Q-methodology studies, our interpretation of 
the factors will focus on characterizing statements which are those with the strongest levels 
of agreement and disagreement (i.e. attracting ratings of +3, +4, -3 and -4).  Where 
participants have given a negative rating (e.g. -3 or -4) to a negatively phrased statement we 
will use positive phrasing to avoid confusion.  Where relevant, interpretation of factors draws 
on demographic data and qualitative responses to the open-ended questions and the factors 
have been named with short titles conveying their key defining aspects as expressed in the 
characterizing statements (Watts & Stenner, 2012). 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Q-Sort 1:  Features Seen as Defining Conspiracy Beliefs and Conspiracy Believers 
 
The eigenvalues of, and variance accounted by, each factor, both before and after 
rotation, can be seen in Table 1.  After rotation, the five factors accounted for 63% of the 
total variance. The table also identifies the 42 participants who loaded on the factors.  Table 
2 shows the full factor array for Q-Set 1 (i.e. ratings for the statements).  In the section 
interpreting each factor, when a particular statement is referenced the first number in 
parentheses is the statement number and the second is the strength of agreement or 
disagreement (as reported in Tables 2 and 4).   
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Factor 1:  The False, Illogical and Harmful Account 
 
Nineteen participants loaded on this factor which accounted for 25% of the variance.  
This account appeared to represent a conventional realist view.  Conspiracy beliefs were 
seen as illogical and irrational (6; -4), based on innuendo and suspicion rather than facts 
(31; -4) and where conclusions had been reached which were not supported by the facts 
(14; +3).  Conspiracy believers were seen as interpreting facts to fit their predetermined 
theory (30; +4), unwilling to change their belief when presented with evidence which 
challenged it (34; -3) and assuming there was only one explanation for an event rather than 
a number of equally plausible explanations (27; +3).  One participant reported that “while 
scoring the statements I was thinking about specific people I know to be conspiracy 
believers and their unwillingness to listen to alternative explanations for the ‘evidence’ they 
have”.  Other highly ranked statements related to common tropes of conspiracy beliefs and 
believers, for example that conspiracy believers think that there are hidden connections or 
patterns behind world events (28; -3), that important information is not shared with the public 
(10; -3) and believing they are the only ones who understand “what is really going on” (18; 
+3).  Participants also strongly agreed that conspiracy beliefs could have serious negative 
consequences, such as parents not vaccinating their children (22; +4) – this was rated highly 
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only on this factor and Factor 3.  This was the only factor where statements relating to the 
thematic content of beliefs and alleged conspirators were not rated highly.   
 
Factor 2:  The Political Critique Account 
 
Eleven participants loaded on this factor which accounted for 15% of the variance.  
This account appeared to emphasize that conspiracy beliefs might be attempts to expose 
the truth about the powerful.  In this factor, narrative tropes like information being hidden (10, 
-4) and seeing hidden connections between world events (28, -4) were noted but so also 
were alleged conspirators, who were seen as powerful elites (11; +4), governments and 
officials (12; +3) and intelligence agencies (21; -3).  Common characterizations of conspiracy 
believers as spending a lot of time reading about conspiracies on the internet (1; +3) and 
believing that there was an intentional plan behind world events (17; -3) were also seen as 
important.  Participants loading on this factor were less critical of conspiracy beliefs and their 
effects and appeared to adopt a more skeptical attitude to the media.  For example, they 
viewed conspiracy believers as thinking that the media did not routinely expose conspiracy 
theories (8; -3) – this was the only factor where this statement was ranked highly.  They saw 
conspiracy believers as crucial in exposing real-life conspiracies (7; +4) and agreed that 
people used the term “conspiracy theorist” as a way of undermining a view they disagreed 
with (26; +3) – these statements were highly rated in the opposite direction in two other 
factors.  Participant 7 stated that “some world leaders hide the truth and treat people like 
idiots by feeding them lies” whilst Participant 23 reported that conspiracy believers preferred 
the term “truth seeker, or agenda researcher”.  More men (9) than women (2) loaded on this 
factor and, with an average age of 34, they were slightly younger than the overall sample.  
All except one were in full-time employment and only one reported a religious affiliation.  
None identified as Conservative and they were mainly from the center or left of politics (3 
Liberal Democrat, 3 Green, 2 Labor and three who identified with other smaller parties). 
 
Factor 3:  The Varied Types Account 
 
Four participants loaded on this factor which accounted for 7% of the variance.  Its 
apparently contradictory sorting patterns suggests, at first glance, that it lacks coherence.  
For example, conspiracy beliefs were seen both as having potentially serious consequences 
(22; +4) and as fun and entertaining (3; +4).  However, our interpretation is that participants 
loading on this factor held in mind a wide range of conspiracy beliefs with diverse effects 
when sorting.  Thus, some beliefs might be harmful, others might be entertaining.  Not all 
conspiracy beliefs might involve conspirators acting in secret (2; -4) though some might 
involve information being hidden from the public (10; -3).  Religious groups were the only 
highly rated alleged conspirators (13; -3) and it may, therefore, be significant that three of 
the participants loading on this factor identified with a religious faith.   
 
Factor 4:  The Entertaining but Ineffectual Account 
 
Six participants loaded on this factor which accounted for 10% of the variance.  This 
account appeared to focus predominantly on conspiracy beliefs which concerned powerful 
elites (11; +3) but which were ineffective in preventing them from gaining too much power 
(33; -3), were held by a lot of people (23; +3) and were seen as entertaining (3; +4) whilst 
two of the statements concerning potential negative consequences (22 and 29) were given 
ratings of zero.  The factor emphasized common conspiracy tropes like believing that there 
was an intentional plan behind world events (17; -4) and that there were hidden connections 
or patterns behind world events (28; -3) with conspiracy believers spending a lot of time on 





Factor 5:  The Self-reinforcing Minority Account 
 
Only two participants loaded on this factor which accounted for 6% of the variance.  
These two young Labor voters saw conspiracy beliefs as not commonly held (23; -3) and not 
helping to expose real conspiracies (7; -3).  They focused on beliefs concerning religious 
groups (13, -4) and corrupt politicians and officials (20, +3) and emphasized the dynamics of 
belief:  conspiracy believers were seen as interpreting facts to fit their predetermined theory 
(30; +3), unwilling to change their belief when presented with evidence which challenged it 
(34; -3) and reinforcing each other’s ideas (32; +3) whilst viewing those who disagreed with 
them as hoodwinked or deluded (25, +4). 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Q-Sort 2:  Aspects Considered Important in Judging the Plausibility of Conspiracy 
Beliefs 
 
 As can be seen in Table 3, 37 participants loaded on Q-Sort 2 and, after rotation, the 
four factors accounted for 70% of the variance.  Table 4 presents the full factor array for Q-
Set 2. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Factor 1: The Conventional Realist Account 
 
Seventeen participants loaded on this factor which accounted for 26% of the 
variance.  This account appeared to represent the conventional realist view that beliefs 
should be based on a reasonable interpretation of persuasive information from a range of 
credible sources.  Participants loading on this factor emphasized the importance of a basis 
in facts rather than opinion (31; -4), the need for persuasive evidence (24; +3) from several 
different independent sources (13; +4) or a whistleblower with access to secret information 
(19; +3) and without strong evidence contradicting the belief (28; -4).  Conspiracy beliefs 
were more plausible if supported by academic and scientific consensus (1; +4) or by 
someone the participant saw as credible (12; +3) – the only factor where this latter statement 
was highly rated.  Participant 54 suggested that whether a belief was plausible was 
somewhat “determined from where the information originates”.  Other important aspects 
concerned the logical structure of conspiratorial arguments.  Thus, conspiracy beliefs were 
seen as more implausible when the conclusions reached were not supported by the 
evidence (27; -3), involved jumping to conclusions (8; -3), or were incoherent and hard to 
follow (18; -3).  However, factors relating to the credibility of conspiracy believers were not 
rated highly.  Participants loading on this factor tended to be predominantly white British 
men in full-time employment. 
 
Factor 2: The Personal Judgement Account  
 
 Five participants loaded on this factor which accounted for 14% of the variance.  In 
common with Factor 1, participants judged the plausibility of a belief by whether there was 
academic and scientific consensus about it (1; +3), no strong evidence contradicting it (28; -
3) and when it did not require one to jump to conclusions (8; -4).  However, in contrast with 
Factor 1, two of the highest rated statements were whether a belief seemed intuitively right 
(34; +4) and was hypothetically possible (3; +4).  At first glance, this appears contradictory 
and could indicate a lack of coherence but this was the only factor where conspiracy beliefs 
were seen as less plausible when the evidence for and against them was seen as confusing 
(5; -3) and it was one of only two factors where a conspiracy belief was seen as less 
plausible when experts appeared to disagree about it (21; -3).  Moreover, compared with 
Factor 1, participants loading on this factor placed much more emphasis on aspects which 
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might affect the credibility of conspiracy believers.  Thus, conspiracy beliefs were seen as 
less plausible if believers were indiscriminately suspicious (6; -4) or overly emotional (35; +3) 
and more plausible if believers were open-minded about alternative explanations (26; +3).  
Thus participant 13, stated “I feel that my judgement is influenced by the personality of the 
person who believes in the conspiracy theory, e.g., if they are introverted or social etc.” 
whilst Participant 15 noted that they “may judge a statement as less plausible if the believer 
has mental health difficulties”.  This may suggest that, in situations of epistemic uncertainty 
(i.e. where there is a lack of expert consensus and the evidence is confusing), when it is not 
possible to make an evaluation of the plausibility of beliefs based solely on conventional 
realist criteria some may draw on other heuristics like a personal assessment of the inherent 
plausibility of a belief and of the credibility of conspiracy believers. 
 
Factor 3: The Skeptical Realist Account 
 
Twelve participants loaded on this factor, which accounted for 20% of the variance.  
Like Factors 1 and 2, participants loading on this factor saw important indicators of the 
plausibility of a belief as including academic and scientific consensus (1; +3), whether it 
required jumping to conclusions (8; -4) and the absence of strong evidence contradicting it 
(28; -4).  As with Factor 1, a belief was seen as more plausible if it was based on fact rather 
than opinion (31; -3), with persuasive evidence (24; +3), from several different independent 
sources (13; +4) including from whistleblowers with access to secret information (19; +4).  
However, participants loading on this factor rated the whistleblower statement more highly 
than Factor 1 and, based on their qualitative comments, they appeared to adopt a more 
skeptical attitude to information provided by politicians and the media.  Thus Participant 7 
claimed that they “trust whistle-blowers who expose secret information as some world 
leaders and the media hide the truth and take people for idiots by feeding them lies” whilst 
Participant 53 suggested that “the power of the media and what they do not say has a big 
impact on beliefs”.  This account thus appeared to emphasize that some sources of 
information might be biased and that a skeptical attitude was therefore necessary.   
 
Participants loading on this factor gave high ratings to aspects affecting the credibility 
of conspiracy believers.  In common with Factors 2 and 4 they emphasized the open-
mindedness of the believer (26; +3).  However, whereas participants in Factor 2 saw 
conspiracy believers’ credibility as influenced by affective factors (e.g. indiscriminate 
suspicion and emotionality) here credibility was seen as influenced by social and 
informational biases.  This was the only factor where participants gave high ratings to 
whether conspiracy believers seemed only to talk to people who agreed with them (20; -3) 
and whether they only cited evidence which supported their belief (36; -3).    
 
Factor 4: The Critical Thinking Account 
 
Three participants loaded on this factor, which accounted for 10% of the variance.  
Five statements were highly rated on at least one other factor but statements which uniquely 
loaded on this factor appeared to emphasize the importance of critically analyzing a belief’s 
implicit assumptions and the reasoning process.  Thus, a conspiracy belief was seen as 
more plausible if it did not involve making too many assumptions (33; +3) and less plausible 
if the belief was supported by circular arguments (32; -4) or appeared to be unquestioned 
within the believer’s social group (37; -4) and if conspiracy believers appeared to be gullible 




This study elucidated a variety of perspectives about defining conspiratorial beliefs 
with narrative tropes attracting most consensus as defining features.  In particular the 
statement ‘“conspiracy believers think that all important information is being shared with the 
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public” received consistently high levels of disagreement across Factors 1-4 (the “false, 
illogical and harmful”, “political critique”, “varied types” and “entertaining but ineffectual” 
accounts) and a rating of -2 in Factor 5 (the “self-reinforcing minority” account) -- see Table 
2.  Our focus primarily on the defining descriptive features of conspiracy beliefs may have 
resulted in more consensus than if we had asked about their representation or meaning.  
However, even so, the meaning of conspiracy beliefs was not entirely absent since the 
“political critique” account appeared to represent an alternative perspective to the arguably 
more pathologizing perspective represented by Factor 1 (the “false, illogical and harmful” 
account).  Moreover, there was variation across the factors on four key issues.  Firstly, whilst 
conspiracy beliefs were seen as common by participants loading on Factors 3 and 4 (the 
“varied types” and “entertaining but ineffectual” accounts respectively), they were 
understood as held only by a minority of people within Factor 5 (the “self-reinforcing 
minority” account).  This mirrors the debate between scholars like Hofstadter (1964), who 
saw conspiracy beliefs as held by (political) minorities, and researchers from narrative and 
cultural perspectives who view them as more widely held (e.g. Butter & Knight, 2019).  
Secondly, within Factor 1 (the “false, illogical and harmful” account), conspiracy beliefs were 
viewed as harmful, within Factor 4 (the “entertaining but ineffectual” account) they were seen 
as entertaining whilst, within Factor 3 (the “varied types” account), they were understood as 
equally harmful and entertaining.  Again, this mirrors differences in the literature.  Cultural 
studies researchers have examined the entertainment derived from conspiracy narratives in 
popular culture whilst psychologists and political scientists have focused more on the harms 
associated with conspiracy beliefs.  Although Douglas et al (2019) briefly note that 
conspiracy beliefs might have beneficial effects for some people this topic has been much 
less investigated within this tradition.  Thirdly, within Factor 2 (the “political critique” account), 
conspiracy theories were viewed as crucial in exposing real-life conspiracies, whilst those 
loading on Factor 5 (the “self-reinforcing minority” account) took the opposite view.  To some 
degree, this reflects debates between generalists -- who assume that conspiracy beliefs are 
inherently implausible -- and particularists who adopt a more case-by-case approach (Pauly, 
2020).  However, some within the conventional realist perspective acknowledge that 
conspiracies do occur though Lewandowsky and Cook (2020) argue that they are 
discovered through conventional skeptical thinking and consideration of evidence and not 
“hyperskeptical” conspiratorial thinking.  Lastly, within Factor 2 (the “political critique” 
account) the term “conspiracy theorist” was viewed as a way of undermining beliefs people 
disagreed with – an argument made by researchers from the non-pathologising approach 
within cultural studies (Butter & Knight, 2019) -- whereas participants loading on Factor 4 
(the “entertaining but ineffectual” account) disagreed with this.  As a whole, these results 
suggest that conspiracy beliefs may not be universally viewed as homogenous.   
 
A variety of perspectives was also elucidated about how the plausibility of conspiracy 
beliefs should be judged with the statement “when a majority of academic researchers and 
scientists endorse the belief” receiving consistently high ratings across the factors 
suggesting this may be an important heuristic for ordinary people (Chinn et al., 2018).  
Although all the factors included at least one conventional realist criterion, two aspects were 
under-emphasized in Factor 1 (the “conventional realist” account).  Firstly, it did not address 
the issue of epistemic uncertainty whereas, in contrast, participants loading on Factors 2 and 
4 (the “personal judgement” and “critical thinking” accounts respectively) considered a belief 
was less plausible if experts disagreed about it whilst those loading on Factor 2 also 
considered whether the evidence was confusing.  Our interpretation suggests that a key 
aspect differentiating these two factors was that participants responded to epistemic 
uncertainty in different ways, in line with the name we gave the factors, with some 
emphasizing the importance of personal judgement (as in Factor 2) and others emphasizing 
aspects of critical thinking (as in Factor 4).  Secondly, Factor 1 (the “conventional realist” 
account) under-emphasized statements concerning informational bias whereas, in other 
factors, higher ratings were given to statements relating to different kinds of bias:  affective 
biases (Factor 2: the “personal judgement” account); passive and implicit biases (Factor 4: 
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the “critical thinking” account); and more active informational biases (Factor 3: the “skeptical 
realist” account).  Participants appeared to respond to informational bias by attending to the 
credibility of conspiracy believers.  Moreover, it is noteworthy that a conventional realist 
approach to plausibility appeared to be associated predominantly with white British 
employed men.  Dominant constructions of rationality may reflect assumptions of gender 
and culture (Falmagne & Hass, 2002) and the influence of this on judgements of plausibility 
merits further study. 
 
From a mainstream research perspective conspiracy beliefs should, therefore, be 
viewed as of varied types and multi-dimensional in nature with potential dimensions 
including:  how commonly held they are; what their effects are (e.g. how effective, harmful 
and entertaining they are); the extent to which they involve plots and conspirators or a more 
general skepticism about information being withheld; the extent to which they might function 
as political or social critiques of the status quo (and how effective they are in uncovering 
actual conspiracies); and the perceived ideological allegiance of the definition.  Similarly, 
judgements of plausibility may also be multi-dimensional with potential candidate dimensions 
including: the level of expert consensus; logical and critical reasoning; the nature of the 
evidence; the extent of epistemic uncertainty; the credibility of conspiracy believers and 
proponents (e.g. how open-minded or explicitly or implicitly biased they are perceived to be); 
and the perceived bias of information sources.  Researchers might also investigate the 
social and psychological correlates of different perspectives on defining and judging the 
plausibility of conspiracy beliefs. 
 
A subsidiary aim of the study was to assess the feasibility of a Q-methodology 
approach to conspiracy beliefs.  In general, the study design appears feasible for future use:  
the procedures worked well and the statements used in the Q-Sets appeared to be 
acceptable to participants.  However, some participants found the online Q-sortware 
program not very user-friendly in some respects and so alternative online platforms (e.g. 
Qualtrics) could be considered.  We suggest that future Q-methodology studies should be 
conducted with groups likely to have very different perspectives on conspiracy beliefs (e.g. 
members of particular conspiracy belief communities, climate scientists etc.) to see if similar 
or different perspectives are elucidated. They could also examine different types of research 
questions.  For example, as we saw in the introduction, there is scholarly debate about the 
meaning of conspiracy beliefs and how they are represented and, of course, these would 
also have implications for policy responses so future Q-methodology studies could examine 
representations, understandings and policy responses.  Such studies might generate even 
more varied perspectives than our focus on definitions and plausibility criteria. Q-
methodology could also be used to investigate both lay and professional perspectives on 
other kinds of contested beliefs, for example, those attracting psychiatric labels like 
“delusions”. 
 
Given the correlation between education and conspiratorial belief (Douglas et al., 
2019) our sample’s higher levels of education might mean we did not adequately sample a 
range of perspectives.  In addition, Q-methodology studies have a number of inherent 
limitations like the forced-choice sorting format.  Developing Q-Sets with sufficient coverage 
and balance can also be a challenge.  We think that we provided sufficient coverage of the 
concourse and none of our participants reported either that the statements seemed biased 
or that they were not able to represent their viewpoint.  Moreover, the inclusion of open-
ended questions so participants can explain their sorting approach also enables them to 
comment on other issues (e.g. some commented on the Q-Sortware program).  However, it 
may be that studies with other groups of participants might reveal that the Q-Sets lack 
sufficient coverage or are unbalanced.  Future Q-methodology studies in different cultural 
contexts could further develop these Q-Sets. 
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There are inherent dangers with factor analytic studies: minority perspectives may be 
over-emphasized whilst naming factors might over-emphasize some aspects and present 
them as more internally coherent than they are.  For example, some of the factors with fewer 
participants appeared less coherent than those with more participants.  In addition, there is a 
danger that factors can be reified.  As noted in the method section, it is not assumed that 
participants loading on a factor would only draw on the discursive resource exemplified by 
that factor.  In everyday conversation, individuals respond to contextual demands and, 
indeed, individual participants might sort the statements differently at other times.  Whether 
the factors have more stability could be examined by future researchers conducting studies 
on a range of populations.  Even so, it should be borne in mind that the factors reported here 
arise from data gathered from a particular group of people in a particular historical and 
cultural context.  Furthermore, it is possible that other researchers might interpret the factors 
differently.  As a result, we have sought to be transparent by clearly stating our criteria for 
selecting factor solutions and by including the full factor arrays, enabling others to develop 
alternative interpretations.   
 
The extent to which these limitations have posed a problem will only be clarified by 
Q-methodology studies on conspiracy beliefs with other populations.  In addition, with 
notable exceptions like Harambam (2020), there has been much less qualitative research on 
conspiratorial belief than quantitative research yet surveys of conspiracy beliefs can be hard 
to interpret as the debate between Freeman et al (2020) and Sutton and Douglas (2020) 
about the extent of Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs in the UK demonstrates.  Further 
ethnographic and discourse analytic research might give more insight into the ways in which 
lay people draw on different discursive resources in different interactional contexts when 
discussing and evaluating conspiracy beliefs. 
 
A social constructionist perspective need not lead to moral relativism – the existence 
of multiple understandings does not mean all are equally desirable. Some conspiratorial 
narratives are clearly used to warrant harmful social actions like the promotion of prejudice, 
political polarization, denial of anthropogenic climate change and so on.  However, our 
findings suggest that, in developing educational and policy responses to such narratives, we 
should consider that there may be multiple competing perspectives about them in the 
general population.  It is possible that interventions targeted at “conspiracy theories” as if 
they were universally understood as homogenous may have more limited effects than those 
which focus on more specific types of narratives and consider how they may be understood 
differently by different sections of the population.  Those designing interventions should 
clarify how target populations might understand conspiracy beliefs so that messages can 
can be appropriately adapted.  For example, for many of our participants, interventions with 
an implicit or explicit assumption that conspiracies never take place or that epistemic 
certainty is always achievable might be less effective than more nuanced approaches.  
Furthermore, educational interventions which focus only on the development of scientific 
reasoning are likely to be insufficient as these were not the only criteria highly rated by our 
participants.  Instead, heuristics like assessing the credibility of authorities could be fostered, 
since these may be more useful in situations of epistemic uncertainty.   
 
Given the skepticism towards the media seen in both the “political critique” and 
“skeptical realist” accounts, interventions might focus on developing “news media literacy” 
which refers to the ability to identify informational bias by learning about how media content 
is produced and distributed, the influence of corporate ownership on these processes and 
thus to discern what information is trustworthy (Craft et al., 2017).  However, in addition, 
interventions could also focus more on understanding the reasons why certain harmful 
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Figure 1:  Visual depiction of the forced quasi-normal distribution in Q-Sort 1 
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Table 1:  Eigenvalues for and percentage of variance accounted by each factor 
 




Number of Sorts (i.e. 
participants) loading 
1 20.82 37 25 1, 2, 10, 14, 15, 19, 24, 25, 
27, 30, 32, 34, 37, 38, 48, 
49, 50, 53, 56 
2 5.41 10 15 5, 7, 12, 13, 17, 18, 23, 40, 
45, 46, 47 
3 3.37 6 7 4, 6, 44, 55 
4 3.01 5 10 11, 16, 22, 26, 42, 51 





Table 2:  Full factor array for Q-Set 1 (defining features of conspiracy beliefs) 
 
      Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor  4 Factor 5 
1  Conspiracy believers spend a lot of time reading about conspiracies on 
the internet  
+1  +3  +3  +3  +1  
2  Conspiracy beliefs assume that conspirators act in secret  +1  +2  -4  +4  0  
3  Conspiracy beliefs can be fun and entertaining   -2  0  +4  +4  +2  
4  People enjoy talking to conspiracy believers  -1  -1  +3  +2  -2  
5  Conspiracy beliefs assume that events are caused by large groups of 
conspirators acting independently  
-1  -2  -2  0  -1  
6  Conspiracy beliefs are logical and rational       -4  0  -2  +1  -2  
7  Conspiracy believers are crucial in exposing real-life conspiracies (e.g. 
Watergate)  
0  +4  -1  -1  -3  
8  Conspiracy believers think that the media routinely expose conspiracy 
theories  
-1  -3  0  0  -1  
9  Conspiracy believers distrust academic researchers and scientists  +2  0  0  0  +2  
10  Conspiracy believers think that all important information is being 
shared with the public  
-3  -4  -3  -4  -2  
11  The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs are often powerful elites  0  +4  0  +3  0  
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12  The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs are often governments or 
officials  
0  +3  +1  +2  +1  
13  The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs rarely involve people from 
religious groups (e.g. Jews, Muslims etc.)   
-2  -2  -3  -2  -4  
14  Conspiracy beliefs take accepted facts but then make a big leap of faith 
to reach conclusions that aren’t supported by the facts  
+3  -2  -4  +1  0  
15  Conspiracy believers think events happen because of the planned 
actions of small groups, rather than broader forces like economic or 
political systems  
+1  +1  -2  -1  +3  
16  Conspiracy beliefs assume that conspirators manipulate events to 
serve their own interests  
+2  +2  -1  +2  -2  
17  Conspiracy believers do not believe that there is an intentional plan 
behind world events 
-2  -3  -1  -4  -2  
18  Conspiracy believers believe that they are the only ones who 
understand ‘what is really going on’  
+3  +1  +1  +1  +2  
19  Conspiracy beliefs are so complex that it can be hard to definitively 
disprove them      
+1  0  0  -1  -4  
20  Conspiracy believers think that all politicians and officials are corrupt  -1  0  -2  -1  +3  
21  The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs do not typically involve 
intelligence agencies 
-1  -3  -1  -2  +2  
22  Conspiracy beliefs can have serious negative consequences, such as 
parents not vaccinating their children  
+4  +1  +4  0  +1  
23  A lot of people believe in conspiracies        0  -1  +3  +3  -3  
 22 
24  Conspiracy beliefs lead to some groups of society being treated badly  0  +1  +2  0  0  
25  Conspiracy believers see those who disagree with them as 
hoodwinked or deluded  
+2  +2  +1  +1  +4  
26  People use the term ‘conspiracy theorist’ as a way of undermining a 
view they disagree with  
0  +3  +2  -3  -1  
27  Conspiracy believers assume that there is only one explanation for an 
event when, in fact, there are a number of equally plausible 
explanations 
+3  -1  +1  0  +1  
28  Conspiracy believers think that there are no hidden connections or 
patterns behind world events  
-3  -4  0  -3  -1  
29  Conspiracy beliefs have caused a destructive level of mistrust in 
society 
+1  0  +1  -2  +1  
30  Conspiracy believers interpret facts to fit their predetermined theory  +4  -1  +2  +2  +3  
31  Conspiracy beliefs are based on evidence, rather than innuendo and 
suspicion 
-4  +1  -3  -1  -1  
32  Conspiracy believers reinforce each other's ideas  +2  +2  +2  +1  +3  
33  Conspiracy beliefs prevent elites from gaining too much power  -2  -2  -1  -3  0  
34  Conspiracy believers are happy to change their belief when they are 
presented with evidence which challenges it  





Table 3: Eigenvalues and total variance for the four extracted factors 
 
Factor Eigenvalue % variance 
before rotation 
% variance after 
rotation 
Number of sorts (Ps) 
loading  
1 33.1943 58.24 26 1, 8, 9, 11, 17, 22, 23, 
31, 36, 38, 39, 41, 47, 
48, 50, 54, 55  
2 2.5487 4.47 14 5, 13, 15, 29, 37 
3 2.1273 3.73 20 7, 10, 12, 16, 18, 20, 24, 
40, 44, 46, 53, 56 
4 1.9077 3.35    10    3, 26, 27 
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Table 4:  Full factor array for Q-Set 2 (aspects considered important in judging the plausibility of a conspiracy belief) 
 
      Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3  Factor 4  
1  When a majority of academic researchers and scientists endorse the belief  +4  +3  +3  +4  
2  When the believer is very sociable and has lots of friends  0  0  -1  -1  
3  When the belief appears to be hypothetically possible  +2  +4  +1  +1  
4  When the believer is highly educated  +2  +2  0  0  
5  When the evidence for and against the belief is confusing  -1  -3  -1  +1  
6  When the believer seems indiscriminately suspicious  -2  -4  -2  -1  
7  When the believer is from a different social group (cultural, ethnic, religious, political 
etc.) to you  
0  0  -1  -1  
8  When the belief seems to involve jumping to a particular conclusion not supported 
by the evidence  
-3  -4  -4  0  
9  When most people you know don’t believe it  0  -2  0  +1  
10  When the belief pins the blame for something on an identifiable group of people 
rather than something more abstract  
0  0  -1  -2  
11  When the conspiracy would have required lots of different people to co-operate  -2  +1  +1  +3  
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12  When someone you think is credible believes it  +3  +2  +1  0  
13  When the belief is based on several different independent sources of evidence  +4  0  +4  +2  
14  When the believer will change their mind in light of evidence which contradicts the 
belief  
+1  -1  -1  +1  
15  When the believer seems to spend a lot of time on conspiracy websites  -1  -1  0  +1  
16  When official sources (e.g. government reports) do not support it  0  -1  +1  0  
17  When the believer does not seem gullible or naïve  +1  +1  +1  +3  
18  When the belief is presented in an incoherent and hard to follow manner  -3  -1  0  -3  
19  When the belief is supported by a whistleblower who has had access to secret 
information  
+3  +1  +4  -2  
20 When the believer only seems to talk to people who agree with them  -1  -1  -3  -2  
21  When experts seem to disagree about the belief  -1  -3  +1  -3  
22  When the believer is not obsessed by the belief  +1 0  0  0  
23  When the belief seems to be the simplest explanation of the evidence  +1  +1  +2  +1  
24  When the believer can provide persuasive evidence for it  +3  +2  +3  +2  
25  When the believer seems eccentric or odd  -1  -2  -1  0  
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26  When the believer seems to be open-minded about alternative explanations when 
they weigh up the evidence  
+2  +3  +3  +4  
27  When the conclusions reached seem to go beyond the evidence  -3  -1  +2  -1  
28  When you are aware of strong evidence which contradicts the belief  -4  -3  -4  +2  
29  When the belief fits with my own political views  +1  0  0  -1  
30  When the believer appears to have mental health difficulties  -1  -2  -2  -1  
31  When the belief seems to be based on opinion rather than fact  -4  -2  -3  -3  
32  When the argument for a belief seems circular  -2  +1  -2  -4  
33  When the belief doesn’t involve making too many assumptions  +2  +2  +2  +3  
34  When the belief just seems intuitively right  +1  +4  +2  +2  
35  When the believer does not get overly emotional about the belief  0  +3  0  0  
36  When the believer only cites evidence which supports their belief and does not 
mention anything which might contradict it  
-2  +1  -3  -2  
37  When the belief seems to be unquestioned within the believer’s social group  0  0  -2  -4  
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